A Klansman Joins the Court by Leuchtenberg, William E.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Crosskey Lectures Law School Lectures and Events
1973
A Klansman Joins the Court
William E. Leuchtenberg
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/crosskey_lectures
Part of the Law Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Lectures and Events at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Crosskey Lectures by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
William E. Leuchtenberg, "A Klansman Joins the Court," Crosskey Lectures, No. 2 (1973).
The
University
of Chicago
Law Review VOLUME 41 NUMBER 1 FALL 1973
A Klansman Joins the Court:
The Appointment of Hugo L. Black
William E. Leuchtenburgj
I. THE NOMINATION
On August 12, 1937, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, rebounding from
the worst setback of his long Presidency, took the first of a series of
steps toward creating what historians would one day call "the Roose-
velt Court." Galling defeat had come less than a month before when
the Senate had killed his scheme to add a Justice to the Supreme Court
for every member aged seventy or over who did not resign or retire.
The original plan would have allowed the President to name as many
as six new Justices, but after a bitter 168-day fight, the measure was
buried, amid loud rejoicing from FDR's opponents. Roosevelt was not
finished yet, however, for one legacy of the protracted struggle was the
creation of a vacancy on the Supreme Court, and it was the President's
prerogative to nominate a successor. The choice he finally made would
trigger an acrimonious controversy and would have a momentous im-
pact on the disposition of the Court.
The vacancy resulted, at least indirectly, from Roosevelt's "Court-
packing" plan. The President had advanced his bold proposal in
February because he was frustrated by the performance of the Supreme
Court, particularly the conservative "Four Horsemen"--Willis Van
t De Witt Clinton Professor of History, Columbia University. This article is an expanded
version of a paper presented as the second annual William Winslow Crosskey Lecture in
Legal History at The University of Chicago Law School on February 28, 1973.
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Devanter, Pierce Butler, James McReynolds, and George Sutherland.'
In May, during the congressional battle, Van Devanter announced his
retirement in what some thought was a well-timed move to dispose of
the plan.2 Roosevelt was urged to drop the Court bill, since replacing
Van Devanter with a liberal would give the Administration a decisive
margin in most cases. As soon as Van Devanter's communication
was made known on the Senate floor, however, the senators crowded
around their colleague, Joseph T. Robinson, to congratulate him on
his impending nomination for Van Devanter's seat. They all but
usurped the power of appointment from Roosevelt, who knew that he
could not avoid honoring the Majority Leader without inciting an
uprising. Unfortunately for the New Dealers, Robinson was a 65-year-
old conservative who had close connections to private utility interests.
So the fight went on into June and July with tempers growing short
in the brutal Washington heat. In July, at a critical point in the Great
Debate, Robinson died. His death doomed the President's Court-pack-
ing scheme, but it left Roosevelt with an opportunity that his oppon-
ents had hoped to deny him-naming the first Justice of his own choos-
ing to the Supreme Court.3
The battle over the Court plan, Joseph Alsop and Turner Catledge
have written, "conferred a strange, almost a lurid importance on the
President's choice for the Supreme Court vacancy."'4 As he had done in
February while preparing his Court-packing message, Roosevelt moved
in a covert manner that put Washington on edge. Each day it was ex-
pected that he would send a name to the Senate, but July ran its
course without a decision and Congress, which had hoped to go home
in June, found itself in the sultry capital in August with adjournment
near and still no word from the White House.
In early August, a New York Times correspondent noted that "an
unusually fierce attack of nervous irritability has seized the 529 legis-
lators." "You have to see the shaking hands and the quivering facial
muscles, hear the rage-quavers of the voices" of Congressmen as they
spoke to appreciate "the violence of the nerve tension." They "snap at
each other over trifles in floor debates" and were biting the heads off
secretaries, prompting the correspondent to report "a new high in
1 Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" Plan, 1966
Sup. CT. RiEv. 347.
2 Letter from Willis Van Devanter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 18, 1937, on file in
the Van Devanter MSS, Vol. 54, Library of Congress.
3 L. BAKER, BACK TO BAcK (1967); Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt's Supreme Court
"Packing" Plan, in EssAYS ON THE NEw DEAL (H. Hollingsworth & W. Holmes eds. 1969).
4 J. Arsop & T. CTtmGE, TnE 168 DAYS, at 295 (1938).
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headless . .. secretaries." One secretary remarked, "Yesterday morn-
ing I had to phone six Senators, all of them my friends, and remind
them of a subcommittee meeting. Five of them bawled me out for it,
and the sixth hung up on me." Another secretary said: "The boss came
back from a subcommittee row over a technicality the other day so ill
that I had to nurse him and dose him for an hour and then call a doc-
tor. It's the first time I've ever known him to be sick without a hang-
over for eleven years." 5
Roosevelt had added to this anxiety when, at a press conference on
July 27, he said that he was exploring the possibility of making the
appointment after the Senate had adjourned. 6 Mutinous legislators
were incensed at the prospect of not having a chance to act on Roose-
velt's selection until after the nominee had donned the black robes of
a Justice and taken part in the Court's decisions. The President's
declaration also indicated that he might be contemplating a particularly
offensive nomination, making it desirable for him to bypass the Senate.
Attorney General Homer Cummings assured Roosevelt that he could
fill a vacancy at any time, even when the Senate was not in session, al-
though, of course, any designee would ultimately have to be confirmed.
The historical record on this point, however, did not give the Presi-
dent as much comfort as he wanted, and the Senate was kicking up a
storm. By early August he had resolved to settle on a nominee before
the Senate adjourned3
Although Roosevelt may have been needling the senators with his
talk of a recess appointment, he did have a valid reason for his inquiry.
On August 4 Stephen Early, the White House press secretary, reviewed
the situation for a Scripps-Howard columnist, Raymond Clapper. Early
explained that the President did not know how long Congress would
remain in session, and he needed two to four more weeks to make up
his mind. It had not been clear until the Senate killed the Court bill
in late July that he would have only one seat to fill. It might be sup-
posed, Early said, that Roosevelt could easily come up with one name
since he had originally sought to choose six, but in fact it was harder
to pick one, because he could not submit a balanced group and had
to "make it a bull's eye." Clapper summarized the President's position
in his diary: "been sixty to 75 names recommended since Robinson
died. All have to be carefully investigated. Is serious matter and Rvt
5 N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1937, § 4, at 7, col. 1.
6 10 COMPLETE PRESDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 70-72 (1972).
7 Letters from Homer Cummings to Franklin D. Roosevelt, July 29, 1937, Aug. 4, 1937,
on file in the President's Secretary's File: Supreme Court, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library,
Hyde Park, N.Y.; Washington Post, Aug. 4, 1937, at 1, col. 4
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would be in bad spot if he sent up a name and then the opposition
dug out some dumb chapter in his record.... Opposition which has
been complaining that Rvt is slapdash would leap on him and say this
is the kind of dumb[b]ell or bad actor he would have given us six of."8
As the tension mounted, congressmen and reporters made book on
whom the President would pick, but they had little to go on. Although
it was expected that Roosevelt would try to heal the breaches within
his party and the Senate by making an especially judicious choice, he
gave no sign of where his favor might light. Even veteran Administra-
tion senators like James F. Byrnes remained in the dark. "I haven't
the slightest idea who will be appointed to the Supreme Court, nor
has anybody in Washington other than the President," Byrnes wrote a
South Carolina friend on August 10. "The President certainly has not
consulted anybody in the Senate about it. The only information we
have is that contained in the Press; namely, that Sam Bratton of New
Mexico, now a Judge of the Circuit Court of Appeals and formerly
a member of the Senate, is receiving serious consideration. It may be
that it is because the Senators have such a high opinion of Bratton
that they think he has a good chance." 9
When Roosevelt finally made his decision, he moved in the same
furtive manner he had used in preparing the Court plan. On the night
of August 11 the President startled the man he had finally chosen by
summoning him to the White House after dinner and, upon informing
him of the honor in store for him, pledged him to silence. Not even
the White House staff knew what had transpired. The next morning
Stephen Early indicated that Roosevelt was still considering a list of
sixty or seventy names and that a selection might not be made during
the current congressional session. Two hours later the President sent
a courier to Capitol Hill with a notice of appointment that Roosevelt
had written in his own hand. The President kept the secret almost to
the very end, but it had become too much for him. Like "a small boy
waiting for his surprise to be revealed," as Virginia Hamilton has
written, he had to blurt out the news to someone. Before the messenger
reached the door of the Senate chamber, Roosevelt told Early the name
of the nominee. "Jesus Christi" Early exploded. FDR grinned.'0
8 Raymond Clapper MS Diary, Aug. 4, 1937, Clapper MSS, Library of Congress. See also
2 H. Icr Es, Tim SECRET DIARY op HARoLD L. Ics 183 (1954).
9 Letter from James F. Byrnes to C.C. Wyche, Aug. 10, 1937, on file in the Byrnes MSS,
Clemson College, Clemson, S.C. Byrnes added that the others being discussed were
Stanley F. Reed and Donald Richberg.
10 V. HAMELTON, HucO BLACK: THE ALABAMa YEAS 275 (1972); N.Y. Times, Aug. 13,
1937, at 1, col. 8.
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II. THE SENATE CONSENTS
The words "I nominate Hugo L. Black .... " sent the Senate into a
state of shock. Senator Black, who had not let on at any point that he
knew what the message contained, now slumped in his seat, white-
faced and wordless, and nervously shredded a sheaf of papers. A few
liberal colleagues came over to congratulate the Alabama senator, but
other legislators did not try to hide their unhappiness." The House of
Representatives responded more volubly. One reporter noted, "From
the House press gallery it was quite a show to watch the reactions of
the Congressmen as the news swept across the floor. A great buzzing
as the name of Black was passed from lip to lip.'
'12
If Roosevelt anticipated immediate acquiescence from the Senate,
he was reckoning without the diehards. Henry Fountain Ashurst, the
eloquent chairman of the Judiciary Committee, rose on behalf of the
administration and asked the senators to confirm instantly the appoint-
ment of this "lawyer of transcendent ability, great, industrious and
courteous in debate, young, vigorous, of splendid character and attain-
ments." Ashurst contended that there was "an immemorial rule of the
Senate that whenever the Executive honors this body by nominating
a member thereof, that nomination by immemorial usage is confirmed
without reference to a committee for the obvious reason that no
amount of investigation or consideration by a committee could dis-
close any new light on the character or attainments and ability of the
nominee, because if we do not know him after long service with the
nominee no one will ever know him."'1 When Hiram Johnson of
California and Edward Burke of Nebraska objected, however, Ashurst
was compelled to name a subcommittee to consider the nomination.
Not since 1888, when President Grover Cleveland nominated Lucius
Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar to the Supreme Court, had a proposed ap-
pointment of a senator or former senator been sent to committee.14
Roosevelt could hardly have made a choice that would have discom-
forted his opponents more. Black was an ardent New Dealer and had
been a strong supporter of Court-packing; indeed, it was said that he
11 N.Y. Times, Aug. 15,1957, at 1, col. 6.
12 Tufty, Michigan in Washington, Pontiac News, Aug. 17, 1937, dipping on file in the
Prentiss Brown Scrapbooks. Senator Brown kindly made these materials available to me
at his home in St. Ignace, Michigan. They have subsequently been deposited with the
Michigan Historical Collections, The University of Michigan.
Is Trm DicaSr, Aug. 28, 1937, at 6. Doubts were raised about Ashurst's argument in
Cole, Mr. Justice Black and "Senatorial Courtesy," 31 Am. PoL. Scr. REv. 1113-15 (1937).
14 N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1937, at 1, col. 8.
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was one of the few senators who actually believed in the plan.15 Most
people had expected that Roosevelt would take pains to name some-
one like a federal judge, but Black's only judicial experience consisted
of eighteen months as a police court judge in Birmingham.10 Little
about him suggested the judicial temperament, and he had especially
incensed conservatives by his performance as an exceptionally vigor-
ous prosecutor on Senate committees. As one biographer described it,
"The paths of his investigations had been lurid with charges and coun-
tercharges, subpoenas duces tecum, searches and seizures, and con-
tempt proceedings,"'17 and the political scientist Earl Latham has noted
that "Senator Black in 1936 was the kind of legislator Justice Black
had no use for twenty years later."' 8
A year before the nomination Newton D. Baker, a onetime progres-
sive leader who had become a prominent corporation attorney, had
written a friend: "I heard last week that the incredible Senator Black
with his eavesdropping, peeping-Tom committee had secured from the
Western Union Telegraph Company all the telegrams sent out of my
office in a year. As I run a law office and not a criminal conspiracy, I
am entirely indifferent as to what he discovered from the telegrams,
but the oftener I permit myself to reflect on this outrage, the more
violent I become. Man of peace as I am, I am quite sure I could not
15 In April a former Republican senator, renowned as the man who had called Western
progressives "Sons of the Wild Jackass," wrote, "Senator Walsh of Massachusetts told me
at a luncheon party the other day, that there are only three members of the Senate who
are really in favor of the President's plan-they being La Follette of Wisconsin, Black of
Alabama, and Minton of Indiana. The first two of these are extreme radicals, and the
third is very much of a nitwit." Letter from George H. Moses to Edward Tuck, Apr. 15,
1937, on file in the Moses MSS, Box 4, Concord Historical Society, Concord, N.H.
16 In June, Justice Stone had written Felix Frankfurter sardonically, "I shall not be
getting much news after I leave here and if anything new or exciting occurs, like the
appointment to the Supreme Court of a man who has legal background and knowledge,
do let me know about it." Letter from Harlan F. Stone to Frankfurter, June 5, 1937, on
file in the Frankfurter MSS, Box 105, Library of Congress.
17 C. WLLAMS, Huco L. BLACK 15 (1950).
18 E. LATHAM, THE COMMUNIST CoNTRovEsY IN WASHINGTON 386 (1966). See also James
Williams, Columbia Oral History Collection, Columbia University, at 770-72; Eugene
Wilson, Columbia Oral History Collection, Columbia University, at 557-58; Washington
Star, Aug. 18, 1937, clipping on file in the H. Styles Bridges MSS, Scrapbook 58, New
England College, Henniker, N.H. For a defense of Black, see the letter from Felix
Frankfurter to Grenville Clark, Dec. 16, 1937, on file in the Clark MSS, Series XXV, Box
1, Dartmouth College. John G. Clifford was particularly helpful in facilitating access to
the Clark papers. I am also grateful to Elizabeth Mason for arranging for the photocopy-
ing of the materials in the Columbia Oral History Collection and to Esta Sobery for
assistance with regard to these and other sources in the Columbia libraries.
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keep my nand off the rope if I accidentally happened to stumble upon
a party bent on hanging him."' 9
Conservatives outdid themselves in expressions of indignation. "If
the President had searched the country for the worst man to appoint,
he couldn't possibly have found anyone to fill the bill so well,"
grumbled one senator.20 "Mr. Roosevelt could not have made a worse
appointment if he had named John L. Lewis,"-21 wrote the columnist
David Lawrence, and Herbert Hoover protested that the court was
now "one-ninth packed." 22 The most devastating critique appeared on
the editorial page of the Washington Post:
Men deficient in the necessary professional qualifications have
occasionally been named for the Supreme Court. And qualified
men have sometimes been put forward primarily because they were
also politically agreeable to a President. But until yesterday stu-
dents of American history would have found it difficult to refer to
any Supreme Court nomination which combined lack of training
on the one hand and extreme partisanship. In this one respect the
choice of Senator Black must be called outstanding.
If Senator Black has given any study or thought to any aspect of
constitutional law in a way which would entitle him to this pre-
ferment, his labors in that direction have been skillfully concealed.
If he has ever shown himself exceptionally qualified in either the
knowledge or the temperament essential for exercise of the high-
est judicial function, the occasion escapes recollection.
23
Although Black came from Alabama, no group was unhappier about
his nomination than the Southern congressmen. A sharp-tongued, un-
relenting partisan who kept too much to himself, Black had never
been a member of "the club."24 More important, he was a Southern
liberal, and his selection signaled Roosevelt's determination to back
those who were attempting to transform the conservative structure of
Southern politics, an inclination that was later manifested in the 1938
purge. A Georgia congressman called the nomination of Black "the
worst insult that has yet been given to the nation;" a Texas congress-
19 Letter from Newton D. Baker to Ralph Hayes, June 10, 1936, Baker MSS, Box 117,
Library of Congress.
20 Detroit News, Aug. 13, 1937, dipping on file in the Blair Moody Scrapbooks, Michigan
Historical Collections, The University of Michigan.
21 THE DIGEst, Aug. 28, 1937, at 6.
22 N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1937, at 6, col. 5.
23 Washington Post, Aug. 13, 1937, at 8, col. 2.
24 J. ALsop & T. CATLEDGE, supra note 4, at 501.
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man said, "I wouldn't appeal a case with him there."25 Black had par-
ticularly antagonized Southern conservatives by sponsoring the wages
and hours bill, which they claimed was denying their constituencies a
competitive advantage granted by God. When reporters asked the
veteran Virginia Senator Carter Glass for a comment on Black, he re-
plied, "Don't start me off again. '26
Yet Roosevelt knew very well that there was not a thing they could,
or would, do about it. Black was a senator, and the sense of collegiality
was so strong that it was inconceivable that the Senate would fail to
confirm one of its members. As the President told Democratic Chair-
man James A. Farley, "They'll have to take him."27
The Senate proved unwilling to entertain the real objections many
felt to Black's nomination. It would not consider the assertion that
Black was too liberal, because ideological differences were not re-
garded as proper grounds for refusing to confirm a fellow senator; nor
was Black's lack of judicial background explored, since it could not
be conceded that any member of the Senate might be unqualified to
sit on the Supreme Court. The little consideration given the appoint-
ment therefore focused on technical matters. Senator William E. Borah
of Idaho claimed that since Van Devanter had taken advantage of
legislation passed earlier in the session allowing retirement rather
than resignation, he was still a member of the Court, and there was no
vacancy for Black to fill.2s Ashurst retorted that if all nine Justices re-
tired or went mad, according to Borah's reasoning, there would be no
Court; even Van Devanter thought the argument was nonsense, since
he had no intention of ever returning to the bench.29 Others speculated
that Black was ineligible for another reason: since the retirement
legislation also guaranteed the pensions of retiring Justices, Congress
had increased their emoluments, and the Constitution forbade any
member of Congress to accept a post under such circumstances. Few
people thought much of that argument either.80
25 N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1937, at 1, col. 6.
26 Tm Dximsr, Aug. 28, 1937, at 6.
27 J. FAR.x, Jin FAaRmV's STORy 98 (1948).
28 Washington Post, Aug. 4, 1937, at 1, col. 4. See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1937, at I,
col. 1; id., Sept. 18, 1937, at 17, col. 4; letter from John Spargo to the editor, Boston
Herald, Aug. 7, 1937, clipping on file in the Spargo MSS, University of Vermont.
29 Raymond Clapper MS Diary, Clapper MSS, supra note 8, Aug. 3, 1937.
80 It had, however, been troubling the administration for several months. Letters from
Edward S. Corwin to Homer Cummings, Mar. 2, 1937, and Cummings to Corwin, Mar. 3,
1937, on file in the Corwin MSS, Princeton University. Some people contended alterna-
tively that Black had been a member of a Congress that had unwittingly created a new
office, from which the Constitution barred him. These issues are carefully dissected in
McGovney, Is Hugo L. Black a Supreme Court justice De Jure?, 26 CALu. L. Rnv. 1 (1937).
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Two days after the nomination, a more explosive consideration
arose-it was said that Black, at the outset of his career, had been asso-
ciated with the Ku Klux Klan. The National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People and the Socialist Party each urged the
Senate to explore Black's racial attitudes.31 The Socialist leader Norman
Thomas also asked the Judiciary Committee to investigate Black's op-
position during the Hoover administration to proposals to equalize
relief between Whites and Negroes, his hostility to antilynching
legislation, and his silence about the "Scottsboro boys," a group of
Negroes convicted in Alabama in what appeared to be an outrageous
miscarriage of justice. "We fully appreciate Senator Black's champion-
ship of labor legislation," Thomas said, but "no other excellence can
fit a man for the Supreme Court whose record is marred by race
prejudice."3 2
Despite these reservations the nomination moved quickly through
committee, but not without occasioning some animosity. Matthew
Neely of West Virginia, an Administration stalwart, allotted the matter
only two hours in a meeting of his subcommittee on Friday, August 13,
the day after the nomination; the subcommittee then reported the
recommendation by a vote of 5-1, with only Warren Austin of Vermont
dissenting on constitutional grounds. On the following Monday, as the
Judiciary Committee convened behind closed doors, William Dieterich
of Illinois accused certain committee members of trying to "besmirch"
their colleague by linking him to the Ku Klux Klan. Dieterich's tirade
nearly resulted in a fist fight with a fellow Democrat when Senator
Burke charged at him. Although "tempers flared to white heat," the
committee approved the nomination 13-4. 33
When the full Senate took up the Black appointment on August
17, Senator Royal S. Copeland of New York opened the debate by
asserting that his Alabama colleague's first election to the Senate in
1926 had been supported by the Klan. Before crowded public galler-
ies, Copeland read a New York Times report on Black's exploitation
of anti-Catholic sentiment in attacking the Presidential ambitions of
Alfred E. Smith.3 4 Copeland asserted, "We are free because we are
31 N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1937, at 9, col. 6.
32 Letter from Norman Thomas to the Committee on the Judiciary, Aug. 16, 1937, in
the National Office files, Socialist Party MSS, Duke University. See also D. CuARm, Scorrs-
BORO (1969).
8s Manchester Union, Aug. 17, 1937, dipping on file in the H. Styles Bridges MSS, supra
note 18, Scrapbook 58. See also V. HAMILTON, supra note 10, at 277-78.
34 N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1987, at 4, col. 1; id., Aug. 14, 1937, at 1, col. 8; id., Aug. 15,
1937, § 1, at 2, col. 1; id., Aug. 16, 1937, at 2, col. 2; id., Aug. 17, 1937, at 1, col. 4; id.,
Aug. 18, 1937, at 1, col. 1. For the claim that the Baltimore Catholic Review supplied
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guarded by the Supreme Court. Catholics, Protestants, Negroes, Jews,
Gentiles, all of us, are guarded by the Supreme Court. But what will
happen if a half dozen men of the mental bias of the nominee should
be seated on the bench? ... Does the leopard change his spots? Will
Mr. Justice Black be any different from Candidate Black?... Naturally
we wonder what Mr. Justice Black would do were another Scottsboro
case appealed to the Supreme Court."3 5
Copeland made no headway with his charges, because they were re-
garded as blatantly political and because the Senate received reassur-
ances. Many believed that Copeland, an anti-New Deal Democrat who
was running for Mayor of New York City, was exploiting the Klan
issue to curry ethnic voters. Although Black left the question unre-
solved when cornered by some of his supporters during the debate, the
unpredictable Borah came to his aid. The Idaho maverick, who even-
tually voted against confirmation on the technical ground of ineligibil-
ity, conceded that senators had received thousands of telegrams about
Black and the Klan, but insisted, "There has never been at any time
one iota of evidence that Senator Black was a member of the Klan ....
We know that Senator Black has said in private conversation, not since
this matter came up but at other times, that he was not a member of
the Klan." When Copeland asked Borah how he would vote if he knew
that Black was or had been a Klansman, the Idaho senator replied, "If
I knew that a man was a member of a secret association organized to
spread racial antipathies and religious intolerance through the coun-
try, I should certainly vote against him for any position." 36
Late in the afternoon of August 17, just five days after the Black
nomination was made and after only six hours of debate, the Senate
confirmed the appointment by the lopsided margin of sixty-three to
sixteen.37 Of the Republicans present all but three voted "nay," as did
six Democrats, including Burke and Copeland. However, some of the
most reactionary Southern Democrats, who had bitterly fought the
Court plan, ended up supporting the administration. Ickes recorded,
opposition senators with evidence against Black, see THE TABLET, Sept. 18, 1937, clipping
on file in the Prentiss Brown Scrapbooks, supra note 12. On Black's role in the 1928
campaign, see letters from Alfred E. Smith to Jouett Shouse, Oct. 2, 1937, and Shouse to
Smith, Oct. 4, 1937, on file in the Shouse MSS, University of Kentucky.
35 N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1937, at 1, col. 1.
36 Id., Sept. 13, 1937, at 3, col. 5. Borah wrote a constituent, "Hawley, I do not
know of a single iota of evidence to the effect that Black was a Ku Kluxer. He has denied
positively that he was and denied it long before this appointment came up." Letter from
William E. Borah to Jess Hawley, Aug. 16, 1937, on file in the Borah MSS, Box 412,
Library of Congress.
37 81 CONG. REc. 9102-03 (1937).
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"Even 'Cotton Ed' Smith, of South Carolina, who 'God-damned' the
nomination all over the place when it was first announced, didn't have
the courage to stand up and vote against a fellow Senator from the
Deep South."3 8 The Klan issue had fizzled, but it left some uneasiness.
In Washington, a one-liner went from mouth to mouth: "Hugo won't
have to buy a robe; he can dye his white one black."39 Despite the
rumbling about the KKK, Roosevelt and the New Dealers had appar-
ently won a stunning victory, less than a month after the opposition
thought FDR was on the ropes. Ickes concluded: "So Hugo Black be-
comes a member of the Supreme Court of the United States, while
the economic royalists fume and squirm, and the President rolls his
tongue around in his cheek."40
The outcome left conservatives disconsolate. When Carter Glass
heard the nomination called a triumph for the common man, he snapped,
"They must be Goddam commonl" 41 Senator Peter Gerry of Rhode
Island explained to Canada's prime minister, "His legal experience
was not considered sufficient and he hasn't a judicial attitude of mind.
He is a prosecutor and not a judge.' 42 An Oregon editor went even
further: "His appointment of Black was the grossest insult to the
Supreme Court and the American people that we have ever been called
upon to accept." 43 Roosevelt's former adviser Raymond Moley com-
mented, "There have been worse appointments to high judicial offices;
but... I can't remember where or when."
44
After Congress adjourned, Hiram Johnson wrote a confidant in
California: "This was a most unsatisfactory session. We wound up by
confirming Black, who is unfit to be a Supreme Court Justice.... Had
it not been for me, Black's nomination would have gone through with
a 'Hurrahl' ... Borah and other distinguished patriots wished it so,
but I had 'guts' enough to stop it. I accomplished nothing-save that
sixteen men in the Senate showed their feeling of his unfitness. I un-
derstand he was a member of the Ku Klux Klan when first elected to
the Senate. He never dared say anything about it subsequently, and
38 2 H. IcKms, supra note 8, at 196.
39 TiME, Aug. 23, 1937, at 13.
40 2 H. ICKEs, supra note 8, at 196.
41 NEwswrK, Aug. 21, 1937, at 7.
42 Letter from Peter Gerry to W.L. Mackenzie King, Aug. 24, 1937. I am indebted to
Erik Olssen of Otago College, Dunedin, New Zealand, for this letter from the King papers
in Canada.
43 Letter from C.E. Ingalls to William Allen White, Aug. 19, 1937, on file in the White
MSS, Box 191, Library of Congress. See also letter from Edward Burke to James Truslow
Adams, Aug. 19, 1937, on file in the Adams MSS, Columbia University.
44 Moley, An Inquisitor Comes to Glory, NEwswEFX, Aug. 21, 1937, at 40.
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Borah and his other friends, saw to it that he was not called as a
witness." 45
Once Black was confirmed, the hubbub died down. Congressmen left
the capital, and Black sailed with his wife to Europe for a vacation.
His name soon disappeared from the newspapers, and the controversy
appeared to be at an end.
III. THE REVELATION
On September 13 the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette detonated a bomb-
shell. It published the first of six articles by Ray Sprigle, an enterpris-
ing reporter who had dug up original materials, including the tran-
script of a Klan meeting, conclusively connecting Hugo Black to the
Ku Klux Klan.46 The series grabbed front page headlines in news-
papers throughout the country.
Sprigle began, "Hugo Lafayette Black, Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, is a member of the hooded brotherhood
that for ten long blood-drenched years ruled the Southland with lash
and noose and torch, the Invisible Empire, Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan. ' 47 Since it was generally suspected that Black had once had a
KKK relationship, that allegation hardly constituted news. Sprigle
developed three points in his series, however, that were very damaging.
First, he demonstrated that Black had not merely run with Klan back-
ing, but had actually been a member of the organization. He gave an
account of the night of September 11, 1923, when Black pledged that
he would never divulge, even under threat of death, the secrets of the
Klan; surrounded by white-robed members of the Robert E. Lee Klan
No. 1 in Birmingham, Black had vowed, "I swear that I will most zeal-
ously and valiantly shield and preserve by any and all justifiable means
and methods... white supremacy." 48
Second, Sprigle recounted vivid examples of the views held by the
Klansmen with whom Black had associated. In a meeting on Septem-
ber 2, 1926, the Imperial Wizard Hiram Wesley Evans said, "We find
that America up to now has done all that has been worth while under
the leadership of native-born, white, gentile, Protestant men. ...
There isn't a Negro in Alabama that dares open his mouth and says he
believes in social equality of the black man.... I mean to tell you any
45 Letter from Hiram Johnson to Frank P. Doherty, Aug. 23, 1937, on file in the Johnson
MSS, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, California.
46 Sprigle was later awarded the Pulitzer Prize for his work.
47 Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Sept. 13, 1937. Phyllis Wallach kindly photocopied this series
of articles for me at the Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
48 Id.
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time they propose to produce equality between me and a certain said
Negro they are simply going to have to hold a funeral for the Negro."
The Imperial Wizard added that Northern Negroes "will be murdered
by the Yankees that have gotten all the sass from the Negroes that they
want."49 On that same occasion the KKK's Imperial Legal Adviser in
Washington observed, "To come down here now and find that you
have given us a man named Black who wears 'white'-do you get that
boys-to occupy a seat in the Senate of the United States is like get-
ting an inspiration before baptism." Turning to Bibb Graves, who had
just won the Democratic nomination for Governor, tantamount to
election, he added, "I am so glad that you have a man all but elected
Governor who comes from a town that, prior to his advent as Exalted
Cyclops of the local Klan, I am told was owned by the Jews, controlled
by the Catholics and loved by Negroes.[Laughter and applause]. Now
he tells me that the Jews have a foreclosure sale at bankruptcy, selling
out, the Catholics are on the run, and the Negroes are in hiding
[Applause]." 50
Most of Black's own remarks that afternoon were unexceptionable.
In fact he spoke of the "principles of liberty which were written in
the Constitution of this country" and the ideal of loving one's enemies.
But he also assured the assembled Klansmen, "I realize that I was
elected by men who believe in the principles that I have sought to
advocate and which are the principles of this organization," and said
to them and to the Grand Dragon, "I thank you from the bottom of a
heart that is yours." 5' 1
Finally, Sprigle made a third and critical contribution-he estab-
lished that, on the same afternoon in 1926, Black, who had resigned
from the Klan in the summer of 1925 for reasons of political expe-
diency, had been awarded a special life membership, a gold "grand
passport." Black had thanked the Klan for this honor, which only a
half dozen men in the United States had received. Most important, the
card was presumably still valid because there was no evidence in the
Klan archives that it had been returned. In short, Sprigle was saying
not merely that Black had been elected with Klan backing, not merely
that Black had once been a bona fide member of the Klan, not merely
that Black had thanked the Klan leaders for their aid, but that Black
was still a member of the Ku Klux Klan.
Sprigle's articles prompted denunciations of Black and Roosevelt
49 Id., Sept. 16, 1937.
50 Id., Sept. 18, 1937.
51 Id., Sept. 15, 1937.
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that far exceeded, in both volume and vehemence, the protests that
had greeted the nomination. Cartoonists had a field day depicting the
members of the Supreme Court assembled in their silk, eight in black
and the ninth in the white robe and hood of the KKK. In the pages
of the American Mercury the mordant critic Albert Jay Nock called
Black "a vulgar dog" and wrote that Roosevelt's appointment "was
the act of a man who conceives himself challenged to do his very
filthiest." 52
Several senators who had voted to confirm Black hastened to declare
that if they had known of his Klan connection they would have op-
posed his elevation to the Court. Somd thought they had been duped,
since Black had temporized when the KKK rumors surfaced in August,
and others had given assurances that there was no foundation to the
allegations. Democratic senators from New Jersey and South Dakota
charged that John Bankhead of Alabama had deliberately misled them
by stating that Black had not been a member of the Klan.53 "I feel that
not only I but the rest of the Senators were deceived and imposed
upon," complained Clyde Herring, and his Iowa colleague, Guy Gil-
lette, added, "I hope something is done to keep Black from the high
court bench."54
The issue hit directly at the core of Roosevelt's urban coalition since
the main targets of the KKK had been Catholics and Negroes. The
revelations also embarrassed Northern Democratic senators with large
ethnic constituencies who had voted for Black. Groups like the Ancient
Order of Hibernians demanded that Black resign or be removed;
55 the
Catholic Club of the City of New York deemed the appointment "a
direct affront to the more than 20,000,000 Catholic citizens of the
United States as well as to countless numbers of other citizens."
56 In
New Hampshire the Knights of Columbus adopted resolutions castigat-
ing Senator Fred Brown for supporting confirmation, 57 and a member
of the staff of Senator Theodore Green of Rhode Island noted, "At a
very large meeting of the Hibernian County Convention last night a
52 Nock, The Packing of Hugo Black, 42 AM. MERctuRY 231-32 (1937). See also letter
from Frank Gannett to C. Greene, Sept. 22, 1937, on file in the Gannett MSS, Box 16,
Cornell University.
53 N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1937, at 1, col. 1; id., Sept. 16, 1937, at 14, col. 2; letter from
J.H. Bankhead to Grenville Clark, Sept. 21, 1937, on file in the Clark MSS, supra note 18,
Series XXV, Box 1.
54 N.Y. Journal and American, Sept. 14, 1937, dipping on file in the Royal S. Copeland
Scrapbooks, Michigan Historical Collections, The University of Michigan.
55 N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1937, at 5, col. 6.
56 Id., Sept. 23, 1937, at 6, col. 2.
57 Id., Sept. 17,1937, at 1, col. 2.
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great many Democrats were denouncing Roosevelt. Very severe criticism
among the Democrats." 58
Irish Catholic politicians played a numerically disproportionate
role in the campaign to get rid of Black. Representative John J. O'Con-
nor, chairman of the House Rules Committee, reported he had been
canvassing congressmen about instituting impeachment proceedings
and had found no one opposed to such a move. 9 "If Mr. Justice Black
was a member of the Klan when nominated and confirmed, his silence
constituted a moral fraud upon the American people," said Represen-
tative Edward L. O'Neill, a New Jersey Democrat." Lieutenant Gov-
ernor Francis E. Kelly of Massachusetts drafted a resolution asking
the President to insist upon Black's resignation,61 and Senator David I.
Walsh, who favored the same course, declared, "There are two counts
against him, one that Black, for political advantage joined the Klan
and took the oath of a Klansman and subscribed to its creeds; two, that
Black obtained his nomination and confirmation by concealment and
thereby deceived the President and his fellow-Senators, especially the
latter." 62
Sprigle's articles appeared just as the campaign for the mayoralty
in New York City was reaching a climax, and Senator Copeland took
full advantage of the opportunity. He told a Carnegie Hall audience:
"I never expected to see the day when a member of that organiza-
tion, sworn to bigotry and intolerance, should become a member of the
court. Shame upon him that he did not have the courage and decency
to tell his colleagues in the Senate that the suspicion of his affiliation
was a reality." Copeland accused his rival, Jeremiah T. Mahoney, of
approving Roosevelt's action in the "placing upon the court of a
Klansman who wears a black robe of court by day and a white robe
of the Klan by night."63 "Imagine a man named Mahoney being mixed
up with the Klan," his opponent spluttered. "Show me a Ku Klux
Klanner and I promise he won't be alive a minute after I see himl"'
Negro spokesmen joined in the hue and cry. The National Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People urged the President
to call upon Black "to resign his post in the absence of repudiation
58 Id. See also id., Sept. 21, 1937, at 3, col. 5.
59 Id., Sept. 27, 1937, at 5, col. 3.
60 Id., Sept. 23, 1937, at 6, col. 1.
61 Letter from Joseph Witherow to Theodore Green, Sept. 13, 1937, on file in the
Green MSS, Box 32, Library of Congress.
62 Memorandum, Sept. 16, 1937, on fie in the Green MSS, supra note 61.
63 N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1937, at 1, col. 3.
64 N.Y. Post, Sept. 16, 1937, clipping on file in the Royal S. Copeland Scrapbooks, supra
note 54.
1973]
The University of Chicago Law Review
and disproof of charges" that he held life membership in the KKK.65
Robert L. Vann, who was the Negro editor of the Pittsburgh Courier,
a special assistant United States attorney general, and also credited with
playing the largest role in swinging Pennsylvania Negroes to the
Democratic Party, wired Roosevelt to remove Black. "Your friends are
on the spot," Vann said. "You must save your friends or you must
release them." 66
Despite this widespread feeling, even Roosevelts conservative critics
in the Senate conceded that nothing could be done if Black decided to
stick it out. The President could not oust a Justice, and since he had
been lambasted month after month for trying to tamper with the Court,
Roosevelt and his supporters surmised that any attempt to coerce
Black into resigning would not be well received. People would be led
to conclude "that, if the President should request Justice Black's resig-
nation, he might also attempt to drive Justices McReynolds, Suther-
land and Butler from the bench." 67 Nor did there appear to be grounds
for impeachment. The civil liberties attorney Osmond K. Fraenkel
observed, "I don't believe a judge can be impeached for something
that happened before his appointment, but even if that were so, I do
not see how he could be impeached for membership in an organiza-
tion. Membership in the Klan, however politically inadvisable, is not
a crime."68
The electrifying disclosures exasperated the President. Washington,
which so recefitly had been the self-confident capital of the New Deal,
was now jeered at as "Klu-Kluxville-on-the-Potomac." 69 The situation
was especially embarrassing to the New Dealers because Roosevelt had
taken a firm stand for religious liberty in 1928 while campaigning for
Al Smith, a Catholic, and had been severely criticized for having too
many Jews in his administration and for giving too many benefits to
Negroes. Despite this record the President now bore the onus of having
brought the main battle of his second term to a climax by naming a
Klansman to the Supreme Court.70
65 N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1937, § 1, at 39, col. 2.
66 Id., Sept. 22, 1937, at 2, col. 6.
67 Id., Sept. 26, 1937, § 4, at 3, col. 1. See also 2 H. IcKEs, supra note 8, at 216-17. For
contrary views, see Philadelphia Record, Sept. 15, 1937, dipping on file in the Frank
Murphy Collection, The University of Michigan Law School; Paul Block editorial, clipping
on fie in the H. Styles Bridges MSS, supra note 18, Scrapbook 60.
68 N.Y. World-Telegram, Sept. 14, 1937, dipping on fie in the Royal S. Copeland
Scrapbooks, supra note 54.
69 Letter from Samuel G. Blythe to Urey Woodson, Sept. 24, 1937, on fie in the
Woodson MSS, University of Kentucky.
70 Letter from Fred Crawford to D. Kinahan, Sept. 23, 1937, on fie in the Crawford
MSS, Michigan Historical Collections, The University of Michigan; Chase S. Osborn,
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In an editorial in the Emporia Gazette William Allen White wrote:
When Franklin Roosevelt is dead and buried and all his bones
are rotted, the fact that he played around with Black and ap-
pointed to the highest honorable office in American life a man
who was a member of the Ku Klux Klan, as Black was charged
when Roosevelt named him, well, as we started to say, when Roose-
velt is dead and gone he will be remembered in the history of this
day and time by the fact that he was not above dishonoring the
Supreme Court by putting a Klansman there.
Why could not a man as smart as Franklin Roosevelt, as brave
and as benevolent, also be wise in a day of crisis?7'
IV. "I DID JOIN THE KLAN"
While Roosevelt's prospects were imperiled by the unexpected turn
of events, Black's life had become all but unendurable. The clamor
followed the new Justice to Europe, where he was still vacationing
when the Sprigle series broke. Journalists hounded him, first in Paris,
then in London. "A dreadfully worried United States judge hid him-
self away in a palatial hotel suite in London yesterday while all his
fellow countrymen were asking for a straight answer to a straight ques-
tion," reported the British Daily Herald.72 One newspaperman jumped
out of a darkened corridor scaring Black's wife, and another seized his
arm as he emerged from a London theater. "I don't see you; I don't
know you; I don't answer you," Black told him.73 The columnist
Dorothy Thompson wrote, "In London tonight a Justice of the United
States Supreme Court is barricaded behind locked doors. His telephone
rings but he does not answer it. Reporters try to interview him but in
vain. This man ... sees only the waiters who bring him food, the
maids who tidy his rooms and the traffic of London moving in the
streets below . . .. He is front page news in England, where the
British are taking revenge for the Simpson case." 74 After letting it be
Editorial Evidence Piles Up, on file in the Osborn MSS, Michigan Historical Collections,
The University of Michigan; Roy 0. Woodruff, Notes and Comments from Washington,
attached to letter from Woodruff to Daniel Reed, Sept. 21, 1937, on fie in the Reed MSS,
Box 14, Cornell University.
71 N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1937, at 3, col. 5.
72 [London] Daily Herald, Sept. 16, 1937. I am indebted to Betsy Wade Boylan of the
New York Times and to Joseph Frayman of the London bureau of the New York Times
for material on the British press response.
73 Toledo Blade, Sept. 18, 1937, clipping on file in the Clark MSS, supra note 18, Series
XXV, Box 1. See also J. FRANK, MR. JusncE BLACK 105 (1949); [London] Daily Herald,
Sept. 16, 1937; [London] Daily Mail, Sept. 16, 1937.
74 PALL MAIL, Sept. 17, 1937, on fie in the Green MSS, supra note 61, Box 32. The
American press had made headline news of the relationship between the King and the
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known that he would sail back to America on a large transatlantic liner,
on which one of his fellow passengers would have been Mr. Justice
McReynolds, Black escaped from his hotel by a service entrance and
drove to Southampton where he boarded a small mail steamer, The
City of Norfolk. He left England, said the Sun, "Klandestinely." 75
No longer would Black be permitted to remain silent. Senator Walsh
said that he had to speak out to be fair to the Catholic senators, and
to those with Catholic and Jewish constituents, who had voted for his
confirmation and who might suffer the consequences in the next elec-
tion.76 Democratic Senator Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri com-
mented, "I do not wish to be in the position of concluding as to the
authenticity of the charges contained in the newspapers against Justice
Black, but it does seem to me that he has had ample opportunity to
answer a simple statement of fact."77 As Black's vessel headed west-
ward across the Atlantic toward Norfolk, a Gallup Poll revealed that
59 percent of those interviewed believed that he should resign if he
were proven to have been a member of the Klan. At Felix Frankfurter's
suggestion, the young Nation editor Max Lerner flew to Norfolk, made
his way through throngs of newspapermen, and at breakfast with Black
aboard ship argued that he should issue an explanation. That night,
Lerner spent four more hours with Black in Alexandria.7 8 Under all
of this pressure, Black finally decided to accept an invitation to speak
over the radio on October 1, but he now had less than two days to
draft his speech.
The address, carried over three national networks with three hun-
dred stations, attracted the largest American audience of the decade,
except for that tuned in to the abdication of Edward VIII. (The huge
audience, however, did lack one prominent listener-Franklin Roose-
velt contrived to be in the Pacific Northwest in an automobile without
a radio as Black spoke.) The fact of Black's speech was a sensation be-
cause of the cardinal rule that Justices do not make statements on public
matters, and the dramatic nature of the occasion was enhanced when
fiery crosses lit the hillsides in different parts of the country.
In his talk, Black admitted having belonged to the Klan-he could
hardly do anything else-but said that he had resigned before enter-
ing the Senate and never rejoined. He minimized the grand passport
American Mrs. Simpson, to whom he was subsequently married, at a time when the
British press could not breathe a word about it.
75 N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1937, at 20, col. 5.
76 Id., Sept. 16, 1937, at 14, col. 2.
77 Id., Sept. 17, 1937, at 14, coL 3.
78 Letter from Max Lerner to Felix Frankfurter, Oct. 6, 1937, on file in the Lerner
MSS, Yale University; Lerner, Hugo Black-A Personal History, NATION, Oct. 9, 1937, at 20.
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as an "unsolicited card" which he did not view as membership in the
Klan, had never used, and had not kept. He also voiced his disdain,
without naming the KKK, for "any organization or group which, any-
where or at any time, arrogates to itself the un-American power to
interfere in the slightest degree with complete religious freedom." 79
Black's speech is remembered today as a courageous denunciation of
the Klan that foreshadowed his future character as a Justice, but in
truth it was not. Black neither explained his past Klan membership nor
offered any apology for signing up with the KKK; nor did he account
for why he had sat through the Senate discussion of his alleged Klan
connections without a word to anyone either in the Senate or, appar-
ently, in the administration. He repudiated none of the atrocities per-
petrated by the Klan in Alabama while he was in the secret order. In
all, he used only eleven of the thirty minutes allotted to him. The most
unfortunate aspect of his talk, however, was not what he failed to say
but what he did say. He spent the first third of his remarks cautioning
against the possibility of a revival of racial and religious hatred, but he
warned that this might be brought about not by groups like the Klan
but by those who questioned his right to be on the Supreme Court.
He went on to affirm that some of his best friends were Jews and
Catholics, told the national audience about his longtime Jewish
chum in Birmingham, and mentioned that he numbered among his
friends "many members of the colored race."8' 0
Rarely in the twentieth century has any statement by an American
public figure brought down such abuse on him in the press as Black's
brief address called forth. The New York Herald Tribune branded
him a humbug and a coward: "The effort of Senator Black to suggest
that he is the real protagonist of tolerance and that his enemies are in--
tolerant is perhaps the greatest item of effrontery in a uniquely brazen
utterance. Only a man heedless of the truth and a man afraid of his
official skin could fall so low."8 1 The Boston Post called on him to re-
sign, for "one who associates with bigots, bids for their support, takes
the bigots' oath and then is so craven that he allows his friends in a
crisis to deny it all, can't clear himself by asserting it was all contrary
to his real character.1s2 About Black's references to Catholic, Jewish,
and Negro friends, the New York Post said, "We might reply in kind
that one of our best liberal friends was a Klansman but we still don't
79 Black, I Did Join the Klan, VITAL SPEECHES, Oct. 15, 1937, at 20.
80 Id.
81 N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 2, 1937, at 14, col. 2.
82 Boston Post, Oct. 2, 1937, clipping attached to letter from Lawrence F. Quigley to
George W. Norris, Oct. 2, 1937, on file in the Norris MSS, Tray 27, Box 3, Library of
Congress.
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think he ought to be on the Supreme Court."88 The Newark Ledger
added that Black had, "resigned from the Klan to maintain an appear-
ance of decency. He should resign from the Supreme Court to attain
the substance of decency."' 4 Catholic outrage ranged across the political
spectrum from the liberal Commonweal to periodicals and spokesmen
on the right.85 "Since there was no sign of his being ashamed for him-
self," wrote the editor of The Catholic World, "I was ashamed for
him; ashamed too for the Supreme Court, ashamed for the President
of the United States."8 6
Roosevelt, however, had no doubt that Black's performance had car-
ried the day. When Jim Farley telephoned him a few days later the
President asked, "What d'you think of Hugo's speech of the other
night?" "He did the best he could under the circumstances, but I
think he should have hit the Klan," Farley answered. "It was a grand
job," Roosevelt returned. "It did the trick; you just wait and see."87
The President was absolutely right. The address was inevitably ap-
plauded, if not altogether convincingly, by Black's supporters in the
New Deal. "If you listened to Mr. Justice Black's radio talk," said Sena-
tor Green of Rhode Island, "I am sure that you must have felt as I did
that he admirably expressed the principles on which Roger Williams
founded this State."88 Elements of Roosevelt's urban coalition also re-
mained loyal. Labor leaders praised Black's speech, and Rabbi Herbert
S. Goldstein of Yeshiva College spoke for others in saying, "As a citi-
zen, I do not seek 'the pound of flesh' and as a Jew, I do not seek re-
taliation."8' 9 Most important, Black's discourse won the majority of his
listeners, albeit not a substantial majority. After the broadcast 56 per-
cent of the people polled by Gallup responded that Black should stay
on the bench, which was precisely what he had intended to do all along.
V. MR. JusTicE BLACK
On the morning of October 4, three days after Black's radio talk,
the Supreme Court opened its fall term, and huge crowds gathered to
83 V. HAMiTON, supra note 10, at 296.
84 N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1937, at 2, col. 6. For a review of editorials on the affair, with
bitter attacks on Black, see Chicago Tribune, Oct. 3, 1937, § 1, at 9, col. 1.
85 See, e.g., COMmONwEAL, Oct. 15, 1937, at 559-60; letter from Reverend Edward Lodge
Curran to Louis Brandeis, Oct. 6, 1937, on file in the Brandeis MSS, University of Louis-
ville Law School, S.C. 20, Folder 2.
86 CATHOLIC Womn., Nov., 1937, at 132.
87 J. FARLEY, supra note 27, at 100.
88 Letter from Theodore Green to Frank J. Keough, Oct. 11, 1937, on fie in the Green
MSS, supra note 61, Box 82.
89 N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1937, § 1, at 3, col. 2.
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see the former Klansman take his seat. Long lines extended for hun-
dreds of feet in the corridor, and much of the throng was unable to
enter the courtroom. When the Justices filed in, it was noted pointedly
that Black sat to the "extreme left" of the Chief Justice. 90 For the first
time in public, Black wore the silk robes of a Justice, but the occasion
was not the hour of triumph the man from Clay County, Alabama
might have hoped for. To the dismay of his supporters, two petitions
were filed to challenge his right to be a Justice. For all Black's efforts
and those of Roosevelt, the controversy continued to simmer.
The President quickly remedied the situation. The next day in
Chicago, he delivered his historic "quarantine" address, and by night-
fall the country had turned its attention from Black to foreign affairs
and the prospect of a second world war.91 A distinguished authority on
international law, John Bassett Moore, wrote, "The President never
was more adroit than in his Chicago speech. All the talk about Black,
balancing the budget, the C.I.O., the 'dictatorial drift,' etc. etc., . . .
suddenly ceased when the war cry was raised." 92 Critics charged that
FDR had deliberately seized the headlines in order to distract atten-
tion from the Black furor. "The speech would never have been made
if there had been no Black case," Hiram Johnson protested.93 Actually,
the situation was more complex than such conspiracy notions suggested.
From Washington, His Majesty's Charge D'Affaires sent the British
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden a more balanced report:
I have every reason to believe that the speech had long been
contemplated, but the President was prepared to await the psy-
chological moment for its delivery. He had returned from his
Western tour fully convinced that, however lukewarm the feeling
regarding the Supreme Court might be in those parts, the electors
as a whole had not lost confidence in his personal leadership. On
the other hand the regrettable "Black and Klan" incident was
still front page news and required something more important to
90 Id., Oct. 2, 1937, at 3, col. 3.
91 Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Quarantine" Address, 1937, in AN AMEMcAN
PmtRER 846-56 (D. Boorstin ed. 1966).
92 Letter from John Bassett Moore to Otho Nowland, Oct. 12, 1937, on file in the
Moore MSS, Box 73, Library of Congress.
93 Letter from Hiram Johnson to Raymond Moley, Oct. 11, 1937, on file in the Johnson
MSS, supra note 45. Newton D. Baker scouted these stories. "The President has too simple
a mind to work out such a solution for the Black problem," he wrote. Letter from Baker
to Ralph Hayes, Oct. 12, 1937, on file in the Baker MSS, supra note 19, Box 117. The
President also took advantage of his trip to Chicago to call on Cardinal Mundelein, an
episode that was interpreted as showing the continued good relations of the Roosevelt
administration with the Catholic hierarchy despite the Black affair. J.F.T. O'Connor MS
Diary, Oct. 6, 1937, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, California.
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remove it to the back page. In fact unkind Wall Street wits are
talking of "a red herring drawn across the Black trail." The Presi-
dent's arrival at Chicago coincided with the decision at Geneva
to refer the Far Eastern crisis to the signatories of the Nine-Power
Treaty. Here was a good opportunity for Mr. Roosevelt to make
his appeal to the nation to abandon a policy of complete isolation.04
Although the quarantine address was followed by reduced attention
to Black in the press, lawyers and Washington correspondents con-
tinued to scrutinize him closely. Even after the Court summarily dis-
missed the petitions to deny Black a seat, 95 every eye seemed to be in-
specting the new Justice. "I went to the Court last week and had the
opportunity to see Mr. Justice Black on the bench," Newton D. Baker
wrote to the former Supreme Court Justice John H. Clarke. "He is
young enough to make a good judge but he has a wavering expression
of the eyes which he will have great trouble in straightening out if he
wants to be like the judges on that Court usually are-impervious to
all considerations except their view of the public good." 96 The veteran
New York Times columnist Arthur Krock had a different perspective;
he observed:
Mr. Justice Black's court-room demeanor provided material for
interesting study. His face had gained color. His manner had ac-
quired content. He looked benign instead of harried. But now
and then, as the Chief Justice read the orders and Mr. Justice
Black looked out upon the lawyers and spectators from his im-
pregnable fortress of life tenure, an expression touched his face
which is common to certain types of martyrs. It was a mixture of
forgiveness and satisfaction, of pity for unreconstructed dissenters
and sympathy for himself who had borne so much in comparative
silence. Charles Dickens, who gave many passages to the descrip-
tion of Mr. Christopher Catesby, would have recognized it at
once.
97
Black might well have nourished such sentiments in his first year on
the bench, for he was permitted to forget neither his Klan past nor his
limited judicial background. In his first month, Black drew scathing
criticism when the conviction of one of the Scottsboro boys came up
on appeal and Black disqualified himself.98 The treatment accorded
94 Letter from V.A.L. Mallet to Anthony Eden, Oct. 12, 1937, F.O. 371, 20668, No. 924E
(A 7543/542/45), on file in the Public Record Office, London, England.
95 U.S. Supreme Court Journal, Oct. 11, 1937, at 4-5.
96 Letter from Newton D. Baker to John H. Clarke, Oct. 20, 1937, on file in the Baker
MSS, supra note 19, Box 60.
97 N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1937, at 4, col. 5.
98 Id., Oct. 27, 1937, at 30, col. 1.
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him by liberal Justices Louis Brandeis and, more particularly, Harlan
Fiske Stone caused greater distress. In strolls through Washington with
the newspaperman Marquis Childs, Stone abandoned discretion and
vented his distress over Black's inexpertise. Childs later said that Stone
was "like an old New England wood-carver, and here they suddenly
brought someone in the shop who doesn't know a knife from a hoe.
This really upset him very greatly."99 In an article inspired by his
chats with Stone, Childs created a hullabaloo by stating that Black's
opinions frequently had to be rewritten by his colleagues in order to
bring them up to the standards of the Court and that Black's incom-
petence had caused the other Justices "acute discomfort and em-
barrassment."1 00
Yet even in these early days Black won admirers for his courage and
skill. Rather than meekly accommodating himself as might be ex-
pected of a newcomer tarred by scandal, he boldly advanced iconoclas-
tic notions. "Mr. Justice Black, dissenting" became a familiar phrase;
indeed, he was said to have set a record for lone dissents.10' Walton
Hamilton expressed his esteem for Black's cleanly written opinions and
the independence of a man who "regards the sacred cows as ordinary
heifers."'1 0 2 By 1939 Erwin D. Canham was observing that "Mr. Justice
Black... has climbed out of the pit into which the circumstances of
his appointment had hurled him, and is on the way to being regarded
as another Brandeis."' 0 3
The allusion to Brandeis suggested both a craftsmanship that de-
meaning references to the police court judgeship had not prepared
critics for and a solicitude for civil liberties that many people had not
expected of an ex-Klansman. In 1940 Black was spokesman for the
Court in two notable decisions. In Chambers v. Florida,04 generally
09 Marquis Childs, Columbia Oral History Collection, Columbia University, at 89-90.
Two days before Black took his seat on the Court, Stone wrote John Bassett Moore, "I
experienced a kind of melancholy amusement in reading your two notes with reference to
the Ku Klux Klan." Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to John Bassett Moore, Oct. 2, 1937,
on file in the Moore MSS, supra note 92, Box 73.
100 Childs, The Supreme Court To-day, HAPERs, May, 1938, at 581-83; cf. A. MASON,
HARLAN FIsxE STONE 451-55, 472-75 (1956); Raymond Clapper MS Diary, Clapper MSS,
supra note 8, May 11, 1938; letter from Clapper to Hugo Black, May 12, 1938, on fie in
the Clapper MSS, supra note 8, Box 8. Learned Hand told an interviewer years later,
Black "isn't my idea of what a judge is at all." Learned Hand, Columbia Oral History
Collection, Columbia University, at 88.
101 Curtis, How About Hugo Black.?, ATLANTic MONTHLY, May, 1939, at 667-68.
102 Hamilton, Mr. Justice Black's First Year, NEw REPuBLic, June 8, 1938, at 121.
103 Canham, The New Supreme Court, Christian Science Monitor, Weekly Magazine
Section, April 8, 1937, at 7. See also I. DLLARXD, ONE MAN's STAND FOR FarEEOM 21-24 (1963);
Green, Mr. Justice Black Versus the Supreme Court, 4 U. NEwARK L. REV. 113 (1939).
104 509 U.S. 227 (1940). Chief Justice Hughes's biographer has written that Black voted
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thought to be his ablest opinion, he spoke for a unanimous Court in
holding that the convictions of four Negroes for murder, obtained by
using coerced confessions, violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. In Smith v. Texas,10 5 he again spoke for all nine
Justices in setting aside the rape conviction of a Negro based on an in-
dictment handed down by a grand jury from which Negroes were ex-
cluded. Black became best known, however, not as the eloquent voice
of a unanimous Court, but as a dissenter urging the Court to break
new ground on civil liberties, particularly as an advocate of uninhibited
application of the first amendment. Justice William 0. Douglas ob-
served in 1956, "I dare say that when the critical account is written,
none will be rated higher than Justice Black for consistency in con-
struing the laws and the Constitution so as to protect the civil rights
of citizens and aliens, whatever the form of repression may be."' 06 A
decade later Alexander Bickel wrote of "a Hugo Black majority" on
the Court, "for in this second half of Justice Black's third decade of
service, the Court was overturning many a precedent that had entered
the books over his dissent."'107 When he finally left the bench in 1971,
Justice Black, who had once been jeered at for his alleged lack of ex-
pertise, was praised for his "extraordinary capacity to clarify and make
vivid the issues in a case" through "seemingly impregnable logic,"' 08
and as one of "the court's intellectual pillars" with a reputation for
"judicial integrity, dignity and tight reasoning."'109
Black's subsequent career made the widespread alarm expressed at
his appointment seem badly misdirected and gave Roosevelt a sense
of vindication. The President had remained rather touchy about the
Black affair. In February, 1938, Raymond Clapper related in his diary
an episode that took place in the Gridiron Club, the organization of
Washington correspondents: "President Geo Holmes told about visit
he and Gould Lincoln made to Rvt on Monday after dinner. Rvt said
like dinner except thought one skit in bad taste. Said that was Klan skit
against taking this case when it reached the Court on petition for certiorari. M. PusEY,
CmuRL.s EvANs HuGHEs 774 (1963). See also McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court
as Conducted by Chief Justice Hughes, 63 H.Av. L. REv. 18 (1949).
105 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
106 Douglas, Mr. Justice Black: A Foreword, 65 YALE L.J. 449, 450 (1956). See also
Frederick Coudert, Columbia Oral History Collection, Columbia University, at 44; Allen
Wardwell, Columbia Oral History Collection, Columbia University, at 111.
107 A. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 168 (1965). Anthony Lewis wrote, "If
any member of the Court saw his philosophy become doctrine in fact, it was not the Chief
Justice but Justice Black." Lewis, Earl Warren, in THE WARREN COURT 1, 2 (R. Sayler ed.
1968).
108 Ferrer, On Choosing justices, TmE, Oct. 18, 1971, at 70.
109 Tiara, Oct. 4, 1971, at 15. These words were jointly applied to Justice John Harlan.
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on Black.... Said Harding had an illegitimate child but Gridiron club
never use anything on that.... Said matter was dying out skit by being
printed in newspapers tended to reopen whole thing keep it agitated.
Holmes told us he couldn't see analogy of Rvt's unless he meant that
Black was like Nan Britton."' u 0 When the Chambers decision was
handed down, Roosevelt seized the opportunity at his press conference
the next day to tell reporters, "I would put in a general dig that some
of the Press should not only give a little praise but also a modicum of
apology for things they have said in the last two years. Is that fair?""'
VI. "A WONDERFULLY GOOD APPOINTMENT"
Black's emergence as a champion of civil liberties has been offered
as proof that Roosevelt knew what he was doing all along, that he
perceived potential in Black that others did not. Perhaps he did; it is
hard to determine, particularly this long after the fact, what one man
sensed in another. It is highly improbable, though, that FDR foresaw
Black's ultimate accomplishments, even if he may have supposed that
Black, like other men, might show new qualities when given the in-
dependence of life tenure.
Other commentators have said that Black's post-1937 conduct ac-
corded with his pre-1937 career, for he had come out of a populist tra-
dition in Alabama and had long been an exponent of civil liberties
and individualism and a friend of labor and the Negro."2 This view
acknowledges that he had been a Klansman, but contends that the KKK
was a populist, prolabor movement that sponsored liberal, humanitar-
ian measures, such as aid for underprivileged children. Some have also
claimed that he joined at the urging of a Jewish friend in order to
exercise his benign influence within the Klan." 3
The evidence for these familiar arguments is, at best, ambiguous.
It is true that Black appears never to have been associated with Klan
violence,"- that he was an attorney for unions, and that he was respon-
110 Raymond Clapper MS Diary, Clapper MSS, supra note 8, Feb. 13, 1938.
Ill V. HAMILTON, supra note 10, at 302.
112 See, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 73, at 12.
"18 Berman, Hugo Black, Southerner: 11. The Negro, 10 AM. U.L. REv. 40 (1961); letter
from I.E. Boyette to Charles Evans Hughes, on file in the Brandeis MSS, supra note 85,
S.C. 20, Folder 2; N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1937, at 2, col. 6.
114 For allegations with respect to the violence of the KKK in Alabama, see "Personal
and Confidential" memorandum from Douglas Arant to Grenville Clark, Sept. 22, 1937, on
file in the Clark MSS, supra note 18, Series XXV, Box 1; Cochran, One Man's Opinion,
Sept. 20, 1937, mimeographed, contained in letter from Naomi Lowensohn to Raymond
Moley, Oct. 2, 1937, on file in the Moley MSS. Mr. Moley graciously made his papers
available to me at his Newsweek offices.
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sible for reforms in court procedure in Alabama. Nevertheless, the
link of Black to populism has been too easily assumed, quite apart
from the difficulty of showing the connection between populism and
modem civil libertarianism. Black did have Negro clients, but he was
also reproached for making a blatant appeal to race prejudice while
defending the accused murderer of a priest.115 The strongest statement
that Daniel M. Berman could make in his informative article in the
Catholic University Law Review was that "there is no evidence that
Judge Black treated Negroes any more harshly than whites.""16 As
late as 1932, Black had opposed a government relief bill because it
would, in code language, interfere with "social habits and social cus-
toms."'1 7 Correspondent Paul Y. Anderson reported that Black "be-
came hysterical over the prospect of a federal relief plan which
might feed Negroes as well as whites, and gave an exhibition which
brought a blush to the face of Tom Heflin, lurking in the rear of the
chamber." 118 The one thing known for certain about Black's attitude
toward the Negro was that, in the very month Roosevelt appointed
him to the Supreme Court, Black was planning to speak in the Senate
against the antilynching bill.
At a press conference in September Roosevelt responded "No" to
the question: "Prior to the appointment of former Senator Black, had
you received any information from any source as to his Klan member-
ship?"119 The President may not have known about "membership," but
it is inconceivable that he had no awareness of a Klan connection. It
was widely recognized, at the very least, that the Alabama senator had
Klan backing when he was first elected to the U.S. Senate.120 In fact,
as a writer in the Washington Post noted, "It is difficult to find a sketch
of Senator Black which does not contain some reference to the Ku Klux
Klan."' 21 In addition, because of his association with the polio center
at Warm Springs, Roosevelt regarded himself as much a son of Georgia
as of New York, and in his many sojourns in Georgia he would have
been likely to have acquired good intelligence about the politics of
neighboring Alabama.
It is more likely that civil liberties considerations did not loom
115 V. HAMILTON, supra note 10, at 84-95.
116 D. Berman, Hugo L. Black: The Early Years, 8 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 103, 108 (1959).
117 H. WARREN, HERBERT HOOVER AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 203 (1959).
118 Anderson, Democracy at Work, NATION, Mar. 2, 1932, at 252. Heflin, formerly Black's
senior colleague from Alabama in the Senate, was a notorious racist.
119 10 COMPLETE PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 210-11
(1972).
120 G. TINALL, THE EUMCENCE OF TnE Naw SouTH, 1913-1945, at 623 (1967).
121 Washington Post, Aug. 14, 1937, at 2, col. 2.
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large in Roosevelt's mind in choosing a nominee. The central issue in
the Court crisis had been the fate of New Deal economic legislation,
and the President was looking for someone to legitimate the growth of
the State. Concentration on such matters, rather than civil liberties
and civil rights, reflected the basic attitudes of 1930's liberalism. It is
true that interest in civil liberties and civil rights grew during the
Depression, fostered by New Deal activities, particularly in the Justice
Department, the inclinations of New Deal administrators like Harold
Ickes, the example set by Eleanor Roosevelt, and the spirit of concern
that the New Deal conveyed. Not until the 1940's, however, did civil
liberties and civil rights come to have a truly prominent place on the
agenda of American liberalism. 122
For many New Deal supporters, Black's Klan affiliation was dis-
tressing, but it was not thought to be central, as it would be today.
Klan membership was regarded as the entry fee Black had to pay for
political advancement in Alabama, nothing more. Senator George
Norris, the most respected of all the progressives and father of the
TVA, who had fought the Klan and been fought by it, called the nam-
ing of Black "a wonderfully good appointment." He added, "Even if
he was a member of the Klan, there's no legal objection to that. I've an
idea many members of the House and the Senate belong to the Klan
also but that is their privilege."'123
Progressives characterized the outcry against Black as a conservative
scheme to discredit the Roosevelt administration and thereby scuttle
the New Deal and prospects for reform. They did not attack what was
said about Black, but rather who said it; when Sprigle's series appeared,
Black's supporters concentrated their fire on his publisher, Paul Block,
and other hostile newspaper titans like William Randolph Hearst.
They offered the defense, in Heywood Broun's words, that "few jus-
tices of the Supreme Court swim up to the high bench as immaculate
as Little Eva on the way to Heaven"' 24 and contended that the ele-
ments opposed to Black would not have shown the same intense con-
cern about the past of a reactionary nominee. The liberal columnist
Jay Franklin wrote, "One point only should be made in relation to
these charges: If Hugo L. Black had been a labor-baiter, a trust cor-
122 For analyses of the impact of the Great Depression and the New Deal on civil
liberties and civil rights, see J. AUERBACH, LABOR AND LIBERTY (1966); P. MURPHY, THE
CONsTrIurxoN IN CRisis Timas (1972); H. Sitkoff, draft of a Ph.D. dissertation at Columbia
University.
123 Statement, n.d., on file in the Norris MSS, supra note 82, Tray 27, Box 3; N.Y. Times,
Sept. 23, 1937, at 6, cols. 2-3.
124 THE Dxosr, Oct. 16, 1937, at 7.
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poration attorney, a man who had amassed a fortune and achieved
political prominence as a result of helping the banks, utilities and cor-
porations to loot the State of Alabama and stifle competition by strong-
arm monopolies, he could have engaged in devil-worship, he could
have practiced polygamy, he could have hunted down run-away share-
croppers with blood-hounds, and eaten babies for breakfast, for all that
his conservative Northern critics would care."'125
The New Dealers insisted that Black should be measured by the
yardstick of twentieth century social reform and by the imperatives of
the Great Depression. The Progressive, the organ of the La Follette
dynasty in Wisconsin, noting Black's "excellent and long standing
record of liberalism," pointed out that Black had fought the big-navy
lobby and the power trust.126 Congressman David Lewis, a Maryland
Democrat who had cosponsored the social security bill, asserted, "The
real issue is not Black's qualifications, but whether the court is going
to keep out of the 'nullification business'-that is quit vetoing acts of
Congress."'127 A Providence newspaper observed, "We don't like the
idea of a Supreme Court Judge having been at any time or for what-
ever purpose associated with the Ku Klux Klan, but the issue is not
religion, it is not race or creed; the issue is economics."' 2
In its "Topics of The Times" column, the New York Times satirized
this sentiment in Alice in Wonderland style:
After a while the White Rabbit summed up the debate, nobody
dissenting.
"You see, Alice," he said, "it's all because we have recently dis-
covered that all life is functional. Once upon a time people
thought there were definite things like truth, justice, honor, mercy,
courage, and so forth. But now we know these things are only
functions of the economic system.... That is why Liberals in the
United States feel it does not matter if a member of the Supreme
Court used to belong to the KKK. The only important thing is
how does he stand on the question of 1/2 cents per kilowatt hour
f.o.b. Norris Dam.' 129
This preoccupation with economic and social policy had led the
President to choose Black, but it was not the only consideration.
Roosevelt certainly sought an enthusiastic New Dealer, but he also
125 Washington Evening Star, Sept. 21, 1937, clipping on file in the Green MSS, supra
note 61, Box 32.
126 TnE PRoGaxSSmwE, Aug. 21, 1937, clipping in the Royal S. Copeland Scrapbooks,
supra note 50.
127 N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1937, § 1, at 3, col. 4.
128 Id., § 1, at 2, col. 3.
129 Id., Oct. 10, 1937, § 4, at 10, col. 4.
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wanted someone who was young, came from a section that did not
have a Supreme Court Justice, and could readily be confirmed. He and
Cummings had reduced a list of sixty names to seven, four of whom
were federal judges. None of the judges, however, including the highly
touted Bratton, had sufficient liberal ardor to suit the President. "Brat-
ton belongs to a judicial school of thought that ought not to be rep-
resented on the bench," he later told Farley.130 So the candidates were
reduced to three: Solicitor General Stanley Reed, Black, and Senator
Sherman Minton of Indiana.
Reed was crossed off as "middle-of-the-road . ..a good man but
without much force or color,"'131 and attention focused on the choice
of a senator. Roosevelt found that solution particularly beguiling,
especially after the Robinson episode in May, in which the Senate in
effect made its own nomination of a Justice. If he named a senator,
even one regarded as a radical, the Senate would be trapped into going
along, a circumstance that appealed to FDR's love of surprise and of
turning the tables on his opponents with a clever move. He was ini-
tially inclined toward the fiery Shay Minton, but the Hoosier senator
recognized that during the recent struggle over the Court bill he had
made too many harsh comments about the Justices who would be his
colleagues. Moreover, he was needed in the Senate. The President
therefore settled on Black, who was young enough at 51, from a large
unrepresented circuit in the Deep South, and, most important, a true
believer in expanding governmental power.
Far from seeking to placate Congress by picking a moderate like
Bratton, Roosevelt wanted to make clear that he was as committed to
the New Deal as ever, and his selection of Black was a symbolic and
defiant act.132 FDR's original plan seems to have been motivated by a
desire not only to reform the Court, but also to punish the Justices
for wronging him in the past.133 The appointment afforded Roosevelt
130 J. FARLEY, supra note 26, at 162. See also Detroit News, Aug. 12, 1937, at 1, col. 1.
On the allegation that Bratton was unacceptable because of his hostility to women, see
letter from Emma Guffey Miller to Marvin McIntyre, Aug. 6, 1937, on file in the Miller
MSS, Folder 14, Radcliffe College, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in
America.
131 2 H. IcEns, supra note 8, at 83.
132 J. ALsoF & T. CATLEDGE, supra note 4, at 296-307; A. Bernstein, Blacklash: The
Making of a Supreme Court Justice, 1937, graduate colloquium paper, Columbia Univer-
sity, 1969; A.A. Berle, Jr., MS Diary, Sept. 14, 1937. Mr. Berle kindly granted me access
to his diaries in his New York office.
133 Roosevelt was particularly upset by the decision in Humphrey's Executor v. U.S., 295
U.S. 602 (1935). See Leuchtenburg, The Case of the Contentious Commissioner: Humphrey's
Executor v. U.S., in F, anom AND RErFoRm: EssAYs iN HoNoR OF HENRY STEELE COMMAGER
276 (H. Hyman & L. Levy eds. 1967).
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another opportunity to express his contempt for the illusion that the
Court was a body that lived on Mt. Olympus and his conviction that
it was essentially a political agency. The Senate was even more of a
target for revenge, for it had just humiliated him in the Court-packing
battle. Donald Richberg, a prominent NeW Dealer, confided, as Clapper
noted, that "Roosevelt was mad and was determined to give Senate
the name which would be most disagreeable to it yet which it could
not reject."'3 4
The President's faith in Black's liberal proclivities proved well
founded. "Although Black's appointment did not mark the precise
chronological point from which the Court's philosophy began its devia-
tion from its previous path," Charlotte Williams has written, "it was
this event which made it plain beyond all doubt that the Court was
about to be reconstituted in the image of the New Deal.' u 35 Black
immediately gave the Administration a 6-3 majority on the Court, and
his lone dissents indicated that he favored even more advanced stands
than Justices like Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone.136 Wallace Mendelson
has calculated that in sixty cases involving the Federal Employer's
Liability Act from 1938 through 1958, Black sustained workingmen's
claims in every case but one, and that in the decade beginning 1949,
in nineteen Sherman Act conflicts between business and consumer
interests, "only Mr. Justice Black found a violation of the law in
every instance."' 37
In nominating Black, the President set the pattern that most of the
other selections for "the Roosevelt Court" would follow. To the
Supreme Court would go progressives, like Frank Murphy and William
0. Douglas, who shared Black's zeal for the New Deal. The typical
appointee would, like Black, be several years younger than William
Howard Taft's representative choice. Only once would FDR pick a
man with prior experience in the federal judiciary; indeed, Black was
exceptional in that, except for Wiley Rutledge, the former police court
magistrate was the only Roosevelt appointee who had ever served as a
judge prior to joining the Court.138
134 Raymond Clapper MS Diary, Clapper MSS, supra note 8, Aug. 14, 1937.
135 C. WrLLAMS, supra note 17, at v. See also Frank, Justice Black and the New Deal,
9 Amiz. L. Rav. 26 (1967).
136 C. PfncHa-r, THE ROOSEvELT COURT 35 (1948). The "conversion" of Owen Roberts
had provided a 5-4 majority even before Van Devanter's departure. Chambers, The Big
Switch: Justice Roberts and the Minimum Wage Cases, 10 LABOR HISTORY 44 (1969).
137 W. MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLAcK AND FRANKFURTER 24, 29 (1961); see Leuchtenburg,
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Black's appointment turned out to be only the first of many for the
President. Roosevelt, who was unable to designate anyone for the
Supreme Court in his first term, named eight Justices, including the
Chief Justice, in the six years from 1987 to 1943. So rapidly did the
composition of the Court change under Roosevelt and Truman that
by the late 1940's Black, whose tenure seemed so precarious in 1937,
was the senior member. Black remained on the bench through the
thirties, forties, fifties, sixties, and into the seventies and would fall only
months short of establishing a new record for length of service as a
Justice.
The Black controversy is rich in paradox and irony-a former Klans-
man becoming one of the century's leading exponents of civil liberties,
a Justice chosen for one set of reasons winning fame for accomplish-
ments that had hardly been anticipated, an Alabaman who created
alarm among Negro groups when he was nominated but who lived to
be denounced as a foe of the white South-but not least of the many
ironies is the fact that the President's bitterly fought campaign to re-
juvenate the Court by terminating tenure at the age of seventy would
end in his naming, as his first appointment, a man who would still be
on the bench on his eighty-fifth birthday and whose lengthy and bril-
liant career would be seen as a testament to Roosevelt's perspicacity.
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